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[Gol] Goldman's argument against a functionalist or theory-
based account of folk psychological terms is, I shall argue, both
question-begging and fallacious. It is question-begging because
Goldman begins by assuming, without argument, a categoriza-
tional view of concepts to the effect that to have a concept is to
have an internal state (what Goldman calls a CR) which is active
just when concept instances are present. He then argues that
this assumption is incompatible with a theory-based view of
concepts, according to which having a concept involves having
an entire theory of the relevant domain. This is because the
theoretical properties of a concept instance will generally not be
available to the categorization system. An argument parallel to
Goldman's, however, could start by assuming that concepts are
defined in terms of theories and argue that, since it is not
possible to distinguish instances from noninstances of a concept
according to their theoretical properties, the categorizational
account cannot be correct. Both arguments beg the question of
whether a categorizational or theory-based view is more appro-
priate.
The argument is fallacious because, in any case, Goldman
does not establish that the categorizational and theory-based
views are incompatible. To see this, consider how Goldman's
argument fares with a concept like mass, which is, after all, a
paradigmatically theoretical term, connected with force, accel-
eration, gravitational laws, and so on. An object can be classified
as having a certain mass purely in virtue of visual or tactile
perceptual input, without any knowledge of causes or effects of
that object which hold in virtue of that mass (Goldman's first
difficulty); without any knowledge of the relevant subjunctive
properties of the object, such as how it would move if various
forces were applied (Goldman's second difficulty); and without
knowing the type identity (i.e., category) of theoretically rele-
vant properties, such as the forces acting on the object, and thus
being sucked into a classificatory regress (Goldman's third
difficulty). None of these problems arise, because classification
is effected by detecting perceptual correlates of mass, rather
than its constituent properties.
Goldman recognizes this possible rejoinder. He notes that a
cube of sugar could be recognized as sugar by its whiteness,
hardness, granularity rather than its theoretical properties such
as solubility. More generally, a theoretical property F can be
detected by its correlated perceptible property E. Having
recognized this possible way out, Goldman then gives a very
puzzling argument against it. He claims that this correlation
could only be learnt in the first place given that the learner has
some independent way of recognizing Fs, thus bringing back the
original problem. This argument assumes that the learning of a
correlation must occur by induction from observed E, F pairs,
but this is a very limited view of how learning can occur. For
example, the learner could simply be told the theory relevant to
Fs, the role that F plays within that theory, and the fact that F
correlates with E. Goldman cannot retort that the learner
cannot learn about Fs because having the concept of F presup-
poses the ability to distinguish Fs from non-Fs, as this would just
beg the question against a theory-based account of concepts.
Finally, it is worrying that Goldman's argument make no
appeal to special properties of folk psychological concepts. If this
form of argument were valid, we could conclude that no con-
cepts are theory-based. The argument would be that for all
concepts there must be some category representation (CR)
which is activated when concept instances are present and not
otherwise, and this will simply not be possible for theoretical
terms. The conclusion that people cannot have the concepts
"proton," "gene," or "force' is counterintuitive enough to pro-
vide a reductio of Goldman's argument, if one were needed.
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